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I’m Not the Person I Used to Be: The Self and Autobiographical Memories
of Immoral Actions
Matthew L. Stanley, Paul Henne, Vijeth Iyengar, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Felipe De Brigard
Duke University
People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways: They evaluate themselves more favorably than
other people, and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in the past. Both strategies rely
on autobiographical memories. The authors investigate the role of autobiographical memories of lying
and emotional harm in maintaining a positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally harming
others, participants judge their own actions as less morally wrong and less negative than those in which
other people lied to or emotionally harmed them. Furthermore, people judge those actions that happened
further in the past to be more morally wrong than those that happened more recently. Finally, for periods
of the past when they believed that they were very different people than they are now, participants judge
their actions to be more morally wrong and more negative than those actions from periods of their pasts
when they believed that they were very similar to who they are now. The authors discuss these findings
in relation to theories about the function of autobiographical memory and moral cognition in constructing
and perceiving the self over time.
Keywords: moral, autobiographical memory, temporal self-appraisal theory, lying, emotional harm
People maintain a positive identity by evaluating themselves in
more favorable terms than they evaluate other people (Alicke &
Sedikides, 2009) and by judging themselves to be better now than
they were in the past (Wilson & Ross, 2003). Rapidly accumulat-
ing evidence also suggests that morality is essential for the con-
struction and perception of one’s identity over time (Strohminger,
Newman, & Knobe, in press). Nevertheless, few studies have
integrated these diverse research programs to explore how autobi-
ographical memories of moral and immoral actions shape one’s
identity. To fill this gap in the literature, we investigated how
individuals, when recalling personal, autobiographical memories
of actions of moral relevance, compare themselves to other people
and to their past selves.
Disparate lines of research have produced convergent evidence
suggesting that people evaluate themselves in more positive terms
than they evaluate others (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Taylor &
Brown, 1988, 1994). In particular, biases and distortions in the
way people remember the past may help to maximize the positivity
and minimize the negativity of their self-assessments relative to
others (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004; D’Argembeau & Van der
Linden, 2008). People are more likely to recall and vividly re-
experience positive information about themselves than they are to
recall such information about others (D’Argembeau & Van der
Linden, 2008; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). Complementary
evidence has shown that people believe they are more virtuous,
intelligent, talented, and compassionate than the average person
(Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Batson &
Collins, 2011). Critically, compared to beliefs in other domains
such as intelligence, competence, or ambition, desirable moral
traits (e.g., honesty) are associated with the largest difference
between judgments of self and the average person (Alicke, Dun-
ning, & Krueger, 2005; Alicke, Vredenburg, Hiatt, & Govorun,
2001; Tappin & McKay, in press). Thus, a sense of moral supe-
riority obtained through evaluating oneself in more favorable
terms than others is a particularly strong bias that helps people
maintain a positive personal identity (Tappin & McKay, in press).
People not only compare themselves with others to maintain a
positive view of self; they also compare their present selves with
their past selves. Some evidence even suggests that people more
frequently compare themselves with their past selves than with
other people (Wilson & Ross, 2000). At least one theory, temporal
self-appraisal theory, explains why we compare our present selves
with past selves. According to this theory, assessments of the
subjective distance between past experiences and the present ones
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facilitate the self-enhancement and self-protection functions of
autobiographical memory (Ross & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Ross,
2001, 2003). People often compare themselves to past selves
because they perceive themselves as improving over time, regard-
less of whether the perceived improvement is accurate (Ross &
Wilson, 2000; Ryff, 1991). Notably, evaluations of former selves,
compared to the current self, become increasingly unfavorable
over time, and people are most critical of subjectively distant past
selves on the traits they believe are most important (Wilson &
Ross, 2001, 2003). However, this work on temporal self-appraisal
theory has not investigated the role of the perceived morality or
immorality of past actions. Comparisons with perceived inferior
past selves—specifically through autobiographical recollections of
immoral actions in the distant past—may be particularly important
for the perception of self-improvement and the maintenance of a
positive identity.
Despite the importance of morality and memory for the con-
struction and perception of one’s identity over time (Strohminger
et al., in press), autobiographical memories of moral and immoral
events have not been extensively studied. Some evidence suggests
that memories of immoral actions are particularly susceptible to
biases and distortions (Kouchaki & Gino, 2016; Pizarro, Laney,
Morris, & Loftus, 2006). Of particular relevance to the present
investigation, Escobedo and Adolphs (2010) identified a pro-
nounced bias in recollections of both moral and immoral memories
by discovering that memories of events that occurred in the nearer
past (nearer memories) tend to be rated as less negative than
memories of events that occurred in the more distant past (distant
memories). This finding accords with work showing that autobi-
ographical recollections often serve a self-enhancement function
(Demiray & Janssen, 2015; Wilson & Ross, 2003). It remains
unclear, however, whether less negative memories with moral
content correspond to nearer events for both actions committed by
oneself and those committed by others to oneself. Relatedly, it is
unclear whether more distant memories are judged to be more
morally wrong than nearer memories. In addition, it is unclear
whether certain kinds of moral transgressions disproportionately
produced the effects obtained by Escobedo and Adolphs (2010).
Finally, because Escobedo and Adolphs (2010) only assessed the
relationship between the affective qualities of memories and the
time that they occurred in the past, it remains unclear whether
these effects still hold when accounting for subjective, psycholog-
ical distance from current selves. The current article investigates
these unanswered questions.
To this end, we distinguish between actor and recipient autobi-
ographical memories. Actor memories concern actions that the
participant committed, and recipient memories concern actions for
which the participant was the target. Furthermore, recent work has
shown that situations involving emotional harm and dishonesty are
among the most commonly experienced moral violations (Hof-
mann, Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014), suggesting that individ-
uals should be more likely to recall multiple memories of lying and
emotional harm than memories for other moral violations (e.g.,
sanctity). As such, Study 1a investigates memories about lying,
and Study 1b investigates memories about emotional harm; Study
2 investigates both kinds of memories.
We report results from three studies that collectively build upon
research showing that memory biases and distortions enable peo-
ple to evaluate themselves in more positive terms than they eval-
uate others and their past selves. We investigate whether there are
actor-recipient differences in the emotional qualities and perceived
moral wrongness of remembered actions involving lying and emo-
tional harm. We also investigate whether the perceived emotional
qualities and moral wrongness of these remembered actions differ
as a function of temporal distance and of perceived subjective,
psychological distance from past selves.
Study 1
Study 1 is divided into two parts and investigates the emotional
and moral content of autobiographical memories involving lying
(Study 1a) and emotional harm (Study 1b) from actor and recipient
perspectives. We make four specific predictions in Study 1. First,
consistent with previous results showing that people are motivated
to evaluate themselves in more positive terms than they evaluate
others (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Taylor & Brown, 1994), we
predict that remembered actions in which the participant is the
actor (i.e., actor perspective) will be rated as less morally wrong
and less negative than remembered events in which the participant
is the recipient of the action (i.e., recipient perspective). Our
additional predictions build upon previous research on temporal
self-appraisal theory (Wilson & Ross, 2003), autobiographical
memories with moral content (Escobedo & Adolphs, 2010), and
the critical role of morality in constructing and perceiving the self
(Strohminger et al., in press). Second, we predict that more tem-
porally distant remembered actions will be rated as more negative
than temporally nearer remembered actions when the participant is
the actor but not the recipient of the action. Third, we predict that
more temporally distant remembered actions will be judged to be
more morally wrong than temporally nearer remembered actions
when the participant is the actor but not the recipient of the action.
Given that people compare themselves to their past selves to
perceive self-improvement and maintain a positive self-image,
actions in more distant memories from the actor perspective may
be judged as more morally wrong than actions in nearer memories.
Fourth, we predict that the more people believe they have changed
since the event occurred, the more likely they are to judge their
actions during that time in the past as more morally wrong in the
actor perspective but not in the recipient perspective.
Study 1a
In Study 1a, participants recalled specific events from their
personal pasts that involved lying from actor and recipient per-
spectives.
Method.
Participants. A total of 51 adults voluntarily participated in
this study. Sample sizes in Study 1a and 1b were determined in
order to obtain a similar number of participants and autobiograph-
ical memories to those acquired by Escobedo and Adolphs (2010)
for their analyses. Three participants were excluded due to failures
in following instructions. Data were analyzed with the remaining
48 participants (Mage  24.50, SD  2.75, age range  20–30; 30
females), and each participant was tested individually. All partic-
ipants were fluent English speakers. Written informed consent was
obtained from each participant in accordance with protocol ap-
proved by the Duke University Campus Institutional Review
Board.
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2 STANLEY ET AL.
Procedure. Participants were seated in a room alone in front
of a computer, on which they typed all of their responses. The
setting was private, and participants were assured that their re-
sponses would be confidential. Each participant was given 30 min
to recall as many specific, autobiographical events as possible in
which he or she lied to another person (i.e., the actor perspective)
and another 30 min to recall as many events as possible in which
he or she discovered that another person lied to him/her (i.e., the
recipient perspective). The order in which participants completed
actor and recipient perspectives was counterbalanced across sub-
jects. Participants were told that all memories must be of events
that have occurred within the past 10 years, must be of one
particular episode specific in time and place, and must have been
personally experienced.
For each memory, participants described the event in two to six
sentences and listed the time and place of the event. Table 1
provides several examples of memories recalled by participants.
To record when the event took place relative to now, participants
were provided with the following options from which they were
instructed to choose exactly one: within the past day, within the
past week, within the past month, within the past year, within the
past two years, within the past three years, within the past four
years, within the past 5 years, within the past 6 years, within the
past 7 years, within the past 8 years, within the past 9 years, within
the past 10 years. Then, participants provided the following ratings
for the actions in each memory in this order: overall, how well do
you remember the event? (1  hardly, 7  very well); how well
do you remember how you felt during the event? (1  not at all,
7 very well); how morally right or morally wrong was the action
performed? (1  very morally wrong, 7  very morally right);
what were your emotions associated with the event (i.e., valence)?
(1  very negative, 7  very positive); what was the intensity of
the emotion you felt during the event? (1  not at all intense, 7 
very intense); and to what extent do you believe you are the same
person now compared to the person you were around the time that
the remembered event occurred (1  very similar, 7 very differ-
ent). Although these data were not analyzed, we included measures
of memory vivacity, detail, and ease of imagining to further ensure
that participants were remembering specific episodes of relatively
short duration from the past. We have reported all measures,
conditions, and data exclusions. Upon completion of the study,
participants were monetarily compensated for their time.
Statistical analyses. All data were analyzed using R with the
lme4 software package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker,
2015). Data were fit to linear mixed-effects regression (LMER)
models with subject always modeled as a random effect. Random
slopes and intercepts were included in each model. Fixed effects
and outcome variables differed between models depending upon
the hypothesis being tested. Significance for models with contin-
uous outcome variables was assessed using the Kenward-Roger
corrected F test with the pbkrtest package (Halekoh & Hojsgaard,
2014), and 95% confidence intervals were computed using para-
metric bootstrapping. To assess the relationship between temporal
distance (i.e., time relative to the present when the event in the
memory occurred) and our other variables of interest within the
LMER framework, the time variable was coded as follows: 0 
within the past day, 1  between the past week, 2  within the
past month, 3  within the past year, 4  within the past 2 years,
5 within the past 3 years, 6 within the past 4 years, 7 within
the past 5 years, 8  within the past 6 years, 9  within the past
7 years, 10 within the past 8 years, 11 within the past 9 years,
12  within the past 10 years. We created these time bins in such
a way to closely resemble the methods from Escobedo and Adol-
phs (2010).
Results and discussion. On average, participants generated
6.13 memories (SD  2.19) in the actor perspective and 4.83
memories (SD  1.85) in the recipient perspective. Across all
participants, a total of 294 memories were generated in the actor
perspective, and a total of 232 memories were generated in the
recipient perspective.
Morality and emotion differ with perspective. Our first pre-
diction was that remembered events in which the participant is the
actor will be rated as less morally wrong and less negative than
remembered events in which the participant is the recipient of the
action. A LMER of perspective (binary factor: actor, recipient) on
moral wrongness revealed a significant effect of perspective—
b  .789, SE  .131, F(1, 46.069)  20.451, p  .0001, 95%
CI [1.50,.527]—such that actions in memories in the recipient
perspective were rated as more morally wrong than those in
memories in the actor perspective (Figure 1a). A second LMER of
perspective on valence revealed a significant effect of perspec-
tive—b  .743, SE  .122, F(1, 46.946)  18.590, p  .0001,
95% CI [.978, .516]—such that memories in the recipient
perspective were more negative than memories in the actor per-
spective (Figure 1b). A final LMER of perspective on emotional
intensity revealed a significant effect of perspective—b  1.343,
SE  .161, F(1, 43.813)  63.310, p  .0001, 95% CI [.995,
1.649]—such that memories in the recipient perspective were more
emotionally intense than memories in the actor perspective (Figure
1c). Even after controlling for differences in how well each event
was remembered and how well participants remembered how they
felt during each event, perspective was still significantly related to
Table 1
Examples of Memories of Lying From Both Actor and Recipient Perspectives Provided by Participants
Perspective Recalled event
Actor I told my (now ex) boyfriend that I had stopped talking to another guy that I had dated in the past. I had actually made a secret, private
email account to message him. My boyfriend had a history of going through my phone, so I hid the messages.
Actor I told a guy I was dating that I turned down an acceptance to a prestigious university even though I had actually never applied in the
first place.
Recipient I was told by my boss that I had been doing a very good job working on one of the experimental projects that I am on. When I talked
to the other graduate students in the lab, I found out that she was actually complaining that I was not working fast enough on it.
Recipient A friend and I were texting about hanging out. She said she was free to come over on a Saturday morning to spend some time together.
It turned out that she wasn’t available when I followed up with her later in the week.
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3IMMORAL MEMORIES AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
moral wrongness (p  .0001), valence (p  .0001) and emotional
intensity (p  .0001). Table 2 depicts overall means for moral
wrongness, valence, and emotional intensity ratings split by actor
and recipient perspectives.
Supporting our first prediction, these results suggest that re-
membered actions that involve lying are perceived as more mor-
ally wrong, more negative, and more emotionally intense in the
recipient perspective than in the actor perspective.
Temporal distance and emotion. Our second prediction was
that more temporally distant remembered actions will be rated as
more negative than temporally nearer remembered actions when
the participant is the actor but not the recipient of the action. An
initial LMER of time and perspective on memory valence revealed
a significant interaction between time and perspective—b  .099,
SE  .038, F(1, 452.321)  6.558, p  .011, 95% CI [.029, .171].
Another LMER of time and perspective on emotional intensity
revealed no significant interaction between time and perspective—
b  .038, SE  .050, F(1, 429.378)  .556, p  .456, 95% CI
[.136, .059]. To better assess these relationships, separate
follow-up LMERs for actor and recipient perspectives were com-
puted.
Actor. A LMER of time on memory valence revealed a sig-
nificant effect of time—b  .085, SE  .025, F(1, 30.515) 
10.199, p  .003, 95% CI [.135, .033]—such that actions in
more temporally distant memories in the actor perspective were
more negative than temporally nearer memories. Even after con-
trolling for differences in how well each event was remembered
and how well participants remembered how they felt during each
event, time was significantly related to valence (p  .005).
Recipient. A LMER of time on memory valence revealed no
significant effect of time—b  .003, SE  .029, F(1, 39.459) 
.051, p  .822, 95% CI [.064, .056]—in the recipient perspec-
tive.
Supporting our second prediction, these results suggest that
actions in more temporally distant memories that involve lying
tend to be more negative than actions in nearer memories in the
actor perspective but not in the recipient perspective.
Temporal distance and morality. Our third prediction was
that more temporally distant remembered actions will be judged to
be more morally wrong than temporally nearer remembered ac-
tions when the participant is the actor but not the recipient. An
initial LMER of time and perspective on moral wrongness re-
vealed a significant interaction between time and perspective—
b  .100, SE  .041, F(1, 429.532)  5.888, p  .016, 95% CI
Figure 1. Frequency statistics for ratings of morality, valence, and emotional intensity split by actor and
recipient perspectives. For memories of lying from Study 1a, frequencies by number of memories recalled across
all participants (y-axis) are depicted for each possible rated value of morality (a), valence (b), and emotional
intensity (c) measures. For memories of emotional harm from Study 1b, frequencies by number of memories
(y-axis) are depicted for each possible rated value of morality (d), valence (e), and emotional intensity (f)
measures.
Table 2
Summary of Overall Means for Morality, Valence, and
Emotional Intensity Ratings Split by Actor and Recipient
Perspectives for Memories of Lying and Emotional Harm
Variable
Memories of lying
Memories of
emotional harm
Actor Recipient Actor Recipient
Morality rating 3.721 2.940 3.161 2.792
Valence 3.500 2.775 3.000 2.250
Emotional intensity 3.401 4.750 4.352 5.227
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4 STANLEY ET AL.
[.022, .182]. Therefore, separate follow-up LMERs for actor and
recipient perspectives were computed.
Actor. A LMER of time on moral wrongness revealed a sig-
nificant effect of time—b  .110, SE  .028, F(1, 35.563) 
10.882, p  .002, 95% CI [.172, .052]—such that actions in
more temporally distant memories in the actor perspective were
rated as more morally wrong than nearer ones. Even after control-
ling for differences in how well each event was remembered and
how well participants remembered how they felt during each
event, time was still significantly related to moral wrongness (p 
.003).
Recipient. A LMER of time on moral wrongness revealed no
significant effect of time (b  .020, SE  .030, F(1, 38.084) 
0.287, p  .595, 95% CI [.080, .040]) in the recipient perspec-
tive.
Supporting our third prediction, these results suggest that ac-
tions in more temporally distant memories of lying tend to be rated
as more morally wrong than actions in nearer memories in the
actor perspective but not in the recipient perspective.
Personal change and morality. Our fourth prediction was that
the more people believe they have changed since the event oc-
curred, the more likely they are to judge their actions during that
time in the past as more morally wrong in the actor perspective but
not in the recipient perspective. Because ratings of personal change
severely violated the assumption of normality, we binarized the
personal change variable with a median split. An initial LMER of
personal change (high change or low change) and perspective on
moral wrongness ratings revealed a marginally significant interac-
tion between personal change and perspective—b  .561, SE 
.292, F(1, 481.585)  3.612, p  .057, 95% CI [.017, 1.126].
Therefore, separate follow-up LMER models for actor and recip-
ient perspectives were computed.
Actor. A LMER of personal change on moral wrongness re-
vealed a significant effect of personal change—b  .855, SE 
.258, F(1, 32.846)  10.520, p  .003, 95% CI [1.331,
.339]—such that the more people believe they have changed
since the event occurred, the more likely they are to judge their
actions during that period of time as more morally wrong in the
actor perspective. Even after controlling for differences in how
well each event was remembered and how well participants re-
membered how they felt during each event, personal change was
still significantly related to moral wrongness (p  .004).
Recipient. A LMER of personal change on moral wrongness
revealed no significant effect of time—b  .273, SE  .260,
F(1, 33.190)  1.083, p  .306, 95% CI [.786, .276]—in the
recipient perspective.
Supporting our fourth prediction, the more people believe they
have changed since the event occurred, the more likely they are to
judge their actions during that time in the past as more morally
wrong in the actor perspective but not in the recipient perspective.
Study 1b
In Study 1b, participants recalled specific events from their
personal pasts that involved emotional harm from actor and recip-
ient perspectives.
Method.
Participants. A total of 48 adults voluntarily participated in
this study. Four participants were excluded due to failures in
following instructions. Data were analyzed with the remaining 44
participants (Mage  22.36, SD  3.29, age range  18–30; 30
females), and each participant was tested individually. All partic-
ipants were fluent English speakers. Written informed consent was
obtained from each participant in accordance with protocol ap-
proved by the Duke University Campus Institutional Review
Board.
Procedure. The procedures used in Study 1b are identical to
those in Study 1a with one exception: each participant was cued to
recall as many specific, autobiographical memories as possible of
emotional harm from actor and recipient perspectives. Accord-
ingly, while Study 1a investigated memories of lying, Study 1b
investigates memories of emotional harm. Table 3 provides several
examples of memories recalled by participants. We have reported
all measures, conditions, and data exclusions.
Statistical analyses. All data were analyzed using the same
software and methods as in Study 1a.
Results and discussion. On average, participants generated
5.36 memories (SD  1.64) in the actor perspective and 5.91
memories (SD  1.41) in the recipient perspective. Across all
participants, a total of 236 memories were generated in the actor
perspective, and a total of 260 memories were generated in the
recipient perspective.
Morality and emotion differ with perspective. Our first pre-
diction was that remembered events in the actor perspective will be
rated as less morally wrong and less negative than those in the
recipient perspective. A LMER of perspective (binary factor: ac-
tor, recipient) on moral wrongness showed that perspective did not
reach significance—b.377, SE .200, F(1, 45.153) 3.555,
Table 3
Examples of Memories of Emotional Harm from Both Actor and Recipient Perspectives Provided by Participants
Perspective Recalled event
Actor I did not go to my friend’s wedding, even though I was free that day. He really wanted me to be there, but I lied to him and said that
I had an unexpected family emergency.
Actor My sister and I forgot that it was Mother’s Day, and we spent all day fighting and arguing with each other and our mom. My mom
started crying and left the house.
Recipient A person racially abused me by calling me “Apu” which is a racial slur used for Indians. She did that when I told her that I did not
support her candidate for the presidency. She got extremely annoyed and said “Apu, you are moron. Go back to eating cow dung
in India”.
Recipient I had been taking care of my dad who had been going through chemo therapy for weeks. One day I told my brother that I wasn’t
going to visit my dad at the hospital that day. My brother got mad at me and screamed at me for changing the schedule. I was hurt
because I had been taking care of dad alone for a week, and I just needed break. My brother didn’t seem to understand how
exhausted I was.
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
5IMMORAL MEMORIES AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
p  .066, 95% CI [.766, .005]. Actions in the recipient
perspective were rated as somewhat more morally wrong than
those in the actor perspective (Figure 1d). Another LMER of
perspective on valence revealed a significant effect of valence—
b  .737, SE  .139, F(1, 46.931)  28.115, p  .0001, 95%
CI [1.001, .446]—such that remembered actions in the recip-
ient perspective were more negative than those in the actor per-
spective (Figure 1e). A final LMER of perspective on emotional
intensity revealed a significant effect of emotional intensity—b 
.852, SE .172, F(1, 44.132) 24.415, p .0001, 95% CI [.521,
1.170]—such that remembered actions in the recipient perspective
were more emotionally intense than those in the actor perspective
(Figure 1f). After controlling for differences in how well each
event was remembered and how well participants remembered
how they felt during each event, perspective was significantly
related to moral wrongness (p  .047), valence (p  .0001), and
emotional intensity (p  .0002). Table 2 summarizes overall
means for morality, valence, and emotional intensity ratings split
by actor and recipient perspectives.
Supporting our first prediction, these results suggest that mem-
ories of emotional harm are perceived as more morally wrong
(after controlling for quality of memory), more negative, and more
emotionally intense in the recipient perspective than in the actor
perspective.
Temporal distance and emotion. Our second prediction was
that more temporally distant remembered actions will be rated as
more negative than temporally nearer remembered actions in the
actor perspective but not in the recipient perspective. An initial
LMER of time and perspective on memory valence revealed no
significant interaction between time and perspective—b  .000,
SE .036, F(1, 474.154) .000, p .994, 95% CI [.079, .066].
Similarly, the LMER of time and perspective on emotional inten-
sity revealed no significant interaction between time and perspec-
tive—b  .021, SE  .048, F(1, 450.528)  .192, p  .662, 95%
CI [.073, .114]. Unlike the results for memories of lying, there
were no actor-recipient differences in the relationship between the
temporal distance of the remembered actions and their affective
qualities.
Temporal distance and morality. Our third prediction was
that more temporally distant remembered actions will be judged to
be more morally wrong than temporally nearer remembered ac-
tions when the participant is the actor but not the recipient. An
initial LMER of time and perspective on moral wrongness re-
vealed a significant interaction between time and perspective—
b  .097, SE  .043, F(1, 455.534)  5.009, p  .026, 95% CI
[.010, .189]. Therefore, separate follow-up LMER models for actor
and recipient perspectives were computed.
Actor. A LMER of time on moral wrongness revealed a sig-
nificant effect of time—b  .158, SE  .037, F(1, 33.924) 
17.875, p  .0002, 95% CI [.227, .093]—such that actions in
more temporally distant memories in the actor perspective were
rated as more morally wrong than those in nearer memories. Even
after controlling for differences in how well each event was
remembered and how well participants remembered how they felt
during each event, time was still significantly related to moral
wrongness (p  .0004).
Recipient. A LMER of time on moral wrongness revealed no
significant effect of time—b  .029, SE  .029, F(1, 27.221) 
.881, p  .356, 95% CI [.083, .028]—in the recipient perspec-
tive.
Supporting our third prediction, these results suggest that ac-
tions in more temporally distant memories of emotional harm tend
to be rated as more morally wrong than actions in nearer memories
in the actor perspective but not in the recipient perspective.
Personal change and morality. Our fourth prediction was that
the more people believe they have changed since the event oc-
curred, the more likely they are to judge their actions during that
time in the past as more morally wrong in the actor perspective but
not in the recipient perspective. Because ratings of personal change
severely violated the assumption of normality, we binarized the
personal change variable with a median split. An initial LMER of
personal change (high change or low change) and perspective on
moral wrongness ratings revealed a significant interaction between
personal change and perspective—b  .564, SE  .264, F(1,
459.931)  4.523, p  .034, 95% CI [.038, 1.086]. Therefore,
separate follow-up LMER models for actor and recipient perspec-
tives were computed.
Actor. A LMER of personal change on moral wrongness re-
vealed a significant effect of personal change—b1.025, SE
.248, F(1, 33.078)  16.473, p  .0003, 95% CI [1.499,
.539]—such that the more people believe they have changed
since the event occurred, the more likely they are to judge their
actions as more morally wrong during that period of the past in the
actor perspective. Even after controlling for differences in how
well each event was remembered and how well participants re-
membered how they felt during each event, personal change was
still significantly related to moral wrongness (p  .0005).
Recipient. A LMER of personal change on moral wrongness
revealed no significant effect of personal change—b  .066,
SE  .188, F(1, 34.301)  .118, p  .733, 95% CI [.477,
.268]—in the recipient perspective.
Supporting our fourth prediction, the more people believe they
have changed since the event occurred, the more likely they are to
judge their actions during that time in the past as more morally
wrong in the actor perspective but not in the recipient perspective.
Study 2
In Study 2, we sought to directly assess the effect of perceived
differences in the self over time on ratings of morality, valence,
and emotional intensity for memories of lying and emotional harm
from both actor and recipient perspectives. Although temporal
distance serves as a useful proxy for psychological or subjective
distance, temporal self-appraisal theory specifically posits that it is
the subjective distance between past experiences and the present
that underlies the self-enhancement and self-protection functions
of autobiographical memory (Ross & Wilson, 2002; Wilson &
Ross, 2001, 2003). Accordingly, we cued participants to provide
autobiographical memories (a) when they believed they were very
different people than they are now (different-self condition) and
(b) when they believed they were very similar to or the same as
who they are now (similar-self condition). In addition, despite
being cued to generate memories of lying and emotional harm in
Study 1, participants still rated some actions in these memories as
morally right and others as morally neutral. In Study 2, we sought
to investigate only memories for morally wrong actions. Hence,
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6 STANLEY ET AL.
we cued participants to provide autobiographical memories of
specifically immoral actions from their personal pasts.
We make two specific predictions in Study 2 that extend re-
search on temporal self-appraisal theory (Wilson & Ross, 2003),
expand upon work from Escobedo and Adolphs (2010), and add to
a growing literature on the central role of morality in the construc-
tion and perception of the self (Strohminger et al., in press). First,
we predict that memories of lying and emotional harm from the
actor perspective in the different-self condition will be judged as
more negative than actor perspective memories in the similar-self
condition. Second, we predict that memories of lying and emo-
tional harm from the actor perspective in the different-self condi-
tion will be judged as more morally wrong than actor perspective
memories in the similar-self condition.
Method
Participants. A total of 105 adults voluntarily participated in
this study via AMT for monetary compensation. Participant re-
cruitment was restricted to individuals in the United States with a
prior approval rating above 85%. The sample size in Study 2 was
chosen in order to obtain a similar number of participants and
memories to those acquired by Escobedo and Adolphs (2010).
Two participants were excluded because they were unable to recall
memories. Three participants were excluded due to failures fol-
lowing instructions. Data were analyzed with the remaining 100
participants (Mage  32.96, SD  8.45, age range  19–65; 38
females). All participants reported being fluent English speakers.
Informed consent was obtained from each participant in accor-
dance with protocol approved by the Duke University Campus
Institutional Review Board.
Procedure. Participants were asked to recall a total of eight
events from their personal pasts and to provide several ratings
for each recalled event. They were instructed to provide only
memories of actions they believed to be morally wrong. Par-
ticipants were instructed to provide exactly one memory from
each of eight cues: (a) during a period of time in which you felt
you were a very different person than the person you are now,
recall a specific memory of an event in which you lied to
someone else; (b) during a period of time in which you felt you
were a very different person than the person you are now, recall
a specific memory of an event in which you found out that
someone else lied to you; (c) during a period of time in which
you felt you were a very different person than the person you
are now, recall a specific memory of an event in which you
emotionally harmed someone else; (d) during a period of time
in which you felt you were a very different person than the
person you are now, recall a specific memory of an event in
which you were emotionally harmed by someone else; (e)
during a period of time in which you felt you were very similar
to or the same as the person you are now, recall a specific
memory of an event in which you lied to someone else; (f)
during a period of time in which you felt you were very similar
to or the same as the person you are now, recall a specific
memory of an event in which you found out that someone else
lied to you; (g) during a period of time in which you felt you
were very similar to or the same as the person you are now,
recall a specific memory of an event in which you emotionally
harmed someone else; and (h) during a period of time in which
you felt you were very similar to or the same as the person you
are now, recall a specific memory of an event in which you
were emotionally harmed by someone else. The order of the
eight cues was presented randomly. Participants were told that
all memories must be of events that have occurred when they
were older than 10 years of age, must be of one particular
episode specific in time and place, and must have been person-
ally experienced.
For each memory, participants described the event in 2–6 sen-
tences and listed the time when the event occurred (month and
year). Then, participants provided the following ratings for the
actions in each memory in this order: How confident are you that
the event occurred when you believe it did? (1  not at all
confident, 7 very confident); How morally wrong was the action
performed? (1 slightly morally wrong, 7 very morally wrong);
What were your emotions associated with the event? (1  very
negative, 7 very positive); What was the intensity of the emotion
you felt during the event? (1  not at all intense, 7  very
intense); and To what extent do you believe you are the same
person now compared to the person you were around the time that
the remembered event occurred? (1  very similar, 7 very differ-
ent). We have reported all measures, conditions, and data exclu-
sions. Upon completion of the study, participants were monetarily
compensated for their time.
Results and Discussion
Participant’s responses for each dependent variable were not
normally distributed. Accordingly, we implemented nonparametric
statistical tests for related samples. Sign tests for paired observa-
tions were used to assess significance and the direction of effects.
To assess effect sizes, we used PSdep (Grissom & Kim, 2012),
which is the probability that in a randomly sampled pair of scores,
the score from one condition (the condition which most frequently
has the higher score) will be greater than the score from the other
condition (the condition which most frequently has the lower
score). Ties were discarded to obtain PSdep values. Possible effect
sizes ranged from 0.50 to 1.00 with higher values indicating larger
effects.
Verifying that participants followed instructions, across all con-
ditions ratings of personal identity change (on the 7-point scale)
when instructed to generate memories in the different-self condi-
tion were much higher than when instructed to generate memories
in the similar-self condition (sign tests: all ps  .001). In addition,
memories of lying and emotional harm cued in the different-self
condition typically occurred in the more temporally distant past
than those cued in the similar-self condition (sign tests: all ps 
.001), and participants were very confident in their assessments of
when the events occurred (range of median confidence ratings
across all conditions: 6–7).
Memories of lying.
Actor. For memories of lying in the actor perspective, we
found a significant difference in moral wrongness (Z 3.604, p
.001, PSdep  0.72) and valence (Z  2.988, p  .003, PSdep 
0.69) but not emotional intensity (Z  1.354, p  .176, PSdep 
0.59) as a function of perceived similarity to the current sense of
self. For memories of events in the different-self condition, par-
ticipants judged their remembered actions as more morally wrong
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7IMMORAL MEMORIES AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
and more negative as compared with memories of events in the
similar-self condition.
Recipient. For memories of lying in the recipient perspective,
we found no significant differences in moral wrongness (Z 
1.488, p  .137, PSdep  0.60), valence (Z  1.793, p  .073,
PSdep  0.62), or emotional intensity (Z  1.424, p  .154,
PSdep  0.59) as a function of perceived similarity to the current
sense of self.
Supporting our predictions, these results indicate that partici-
pants are more likely to rate their own acts of lying as more
morally wrong when they felt that they were very different
than—as opposed to very similar to—who they are now. Notably,
the effect sizes for morality ratings are larger than those for
valence; this may suggest that moral judgments of past actions
better facilitate the perception of improvement in oneself over
time. Figure 2a summarizes the results involving lying from the
Sign Tests. Figure 3 depicts frequency statistics for each measure
split by condition (different-self vs. similar-self) and perspective.
Memories of emotional harm.
Actor. For memories of emotional harm in the actor perspec-
tive, we found a significant difference in moral wrongness (Z 
4.002, p  .001, PSdep  0.75) and valence (Z  2.757, p  .006,
PSdep  0.69) but not emotional intensity (Z  .125, p  .901,
PSdep  0.52) as a function of perceived similarity to the current
sense of self. For memories in the different-self condition, partic-
ipants perceived those actions as more morally wrong and more
negative compared with memories in the similar-self condition.
Recipient. For memories of emotional harm in the recipient
perspective, we found no significant differences in moral wrong-
ness (Z  .889, p  .374, PSdep  0.56), valence (Z  1.143, p 
.253, PSdep  0.59), or emotional intensity (Z  .265, p  .791,
PSdep  0.53) as a function of perceived similarity to the current
sense of self.
Supporting our predictions, these results indicate that partici-
pants are more likely to rate their own acts of emotional harming
as more morally wrong when they felt that they were very different
than—as opposed to very similar to—who they are now. As was
the case for immoral lies, the effect sizes for morality ratings are
larger than those for valence; this may suggest that moral judg-
ments of past actions better facilitate the perception of improve-
ment in oneself over time. Figure 2b summarizes the results
involving emotional harm from the Sign Tests. Figure 4 depicts
frequency statistics for each measure split by condition and per-
spective.
General Discussion
We report three studies investigating whether there are actor-
recipient differences in the emotional qualities and perceived
moral wrongness of remembered actions from one’s personal past
and whether the perceived emotional and moral content of these
remembered actions differs as a function of temporal distance and
perceived changes in the self over time. These studies yielded four
main findings. First, remembered actions in the actor perspective
were rated as less morally wrong and less negative than remem-
bered actions in the recipient perspective. These findings held for
memories of lying and of emotional harm. Second, remembered
actions rated as more negative were more temporally distant in the
actor perspective than in the recipient perspective—but only for
memories of lying. Third, the more temporally distant remembered
actions were, the more likely they were to be rated as more morally
wrong in the actor perspective but not in the recipient perspective.
These findings held both for memories of lying and emotional
harm. Fourth, during periods of time when participants felt they
were very different than—as opposed to very similar to—who they
are now, they judged their own acts of lying and emotional harm
as more morally wrong and more negative.
Consistent with research showing that people evaluate them-
selves in more positive terms than they evaluate others (Alicke &
Sedikides, 2009; Taylor & Brown, 1988, 1994), our results suggest
that for autobiographical memories of lying and emotional harm,
people recall events that are rated as being less morally wrong, less
negative, and less emotionally intense when they, as opposed to
someone else, commit the act. Autobiographical memory research
has consistently shown that recollections of past events are easily
and often distorted (Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011;
Schacter & Slotnick, 2004). Moreover, memories of immoral
events are often emotionally salient (Escobedo & Adolphs, 2010),
and emotional memories tend to be recollected vividly and readily
but often inaccurately (Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Heuer &
Reisberg, 1990). Given the frequent facilitation of self-
enhancement and self-protection through viewing one’s actions as
more favorable than others’ and the frequent distortion of emo-
Figure 2. Frequency statistics for morality, valence, and emotional in-
tensity ratings for memories of lying (a) and emotional harm (b) in both
actor and recipient perspectives. The percentage of negative differences
(i.e., different-self condition minus similar-self condition), positive differ-
ences (i.e., similar-self condition minus different-self), and ties (i.e., no
difference in ratings between different-self and similar-self conditions) are
depicted.
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8 STANLEY ET AL.
tional memories, our results can be interpreted in two nonexclusive
ways: (a) people are motivated to recall specific events that reduce
or mitigate a negative self-image or enhance a positive one, or (b)
people reconstruct or reinterpret existing memories to reduce or
mitigate a negative self-image or enhance a positive one. Further
work needs to determine the circumstances under which either of
these two possibilities hold.
Consistent with Escobedo and Adolphs (2010) regarding the
relationship between the affective qualities of memories and their
temporal distance, we also found that actor perspective memories
of lying that were more negative tended to be more temporally
distant than less negative memories (Study 1a). Moreover, assess-
ing subjective, psychological distance between current and past
selves, we found that memories of lying in the different-self
condition were rated as more negative than memories of lying in
the similar-self condition (Study 2). Our results for memories of
emotional harm are more nuanced. When participants were cued to
provide memories of emotional harm, we found no relationship
between valence and temporal distance in the actor perspective
(Study 1b). However, when we indexed subjective, psychological
distance and specifically cued participants to provide memories
involving immoral emotional harm, these memories in the
different-self condition were rated as more negative than those in
the similar-self condition (Study 2). These differences between our
studies are easily explained. When participants were not specifi-
cally cued only to provide memories of immoral actions, they
sometimes recalled memories of lying and emotional harm that
they rated as being morally neutral (see Figure 1). In Study 1b,
temporal distance was used as a proxy for subjective, psycholog-
ical distance. The inclusion of these morally neutral memories and
the use of temporal distance as a proxy for subjective, psycholog-
ical distance increases noise, which, in turn, decreases the likeli-
hood of uncovering the predicted effects. In Study 2, we removed
this unwanted noise by assessing subjective, psychological dis-
tance and by specifically asking participants to recall memories of
immoral actions, and we found a significant difference in both
valence and moral wrongness between the different-self condition
and the similar-self condition.
Like Escobedo and Adolphs (2010), our results are also largely
consistent with and expand upon work on temporal self-appraisal
theory, which maintains that people view themselves as improving
over time in order to enhance or protect the current self (Wilson &
Ross, 2003). Work supporting this theory shows that people eval-
uate their current self more favorably than earlier selves and
perceive themselves as having improved over time (Wilson &
Ross, 2001, 2003). Our results show that more temporally distant
memories were rated as more morally wrong than nearer memo-
ries. Similarly, assessing subjective, psychological distance from
the current self, we found that remembered actions of lying and
emotional harm in the subjectively distant past were rated as more
morally wrong than memories in the subjectively nearer past.
One might be tempted to argue that more morally wrong acts are
more negative and emotionally intense, and they are encoded more
deeply in memory, so they tend to be remembered longer and
recollected more easily. Accordingly, one might suggest that our
results are simply the product of the differential rate that memories
fade over time as a function of their emotional valence and
intensity. If this were the case, however, then we would expect that
Figure 3. For memories of lying, we display frequency statistics for ratings of morality, valence, and emotional
intensity split by actor and recipient perspectives and by different-self and similar-self conditions. For memories
in the actor perspective, frequencies by number of memories recalled (y-axis) are depicted for each possible rated
value of morality (a), valence (b), and emotional intensity (c) measures. For memories in the recipient
perspective, frequencies by number of memories recalled (y-axis) are depicted for each possible rated value of
morality (d), valence (e), and emotional intensity (f) measures.
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9IMMORAL MEMORIES AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
more negative, emotionally intense, and morally wrong memories
would be more temporally and subjectively distant from both actor
and recipient perspectives. Our data show that there is no relation-
ship between temporal or subjective distance and valence, emo-
tional intensity, or moral wrongness in the recipient perspective.
Furthermore, research on the fading affect bias suggests that affect
associated with negative memories fades more quickly than affect
associated other kinds of memories (Skowronski, Walker, Hender-
son, & Bond, 2014). Therefore, it is unlikely that our findings are
the product of a more general phenomenon that memories with
different emotional qualities are forgotten at different rates over
time.
Autobiographical memory and morality are essential in the
construction and perception of one’s identity over time. Many
researchers have found that that some parts of the self are more
authentic, genuine, or central than others (Strohminger et al., in
press). Interestingly, when different characteristics and qualities
are compared with each other (e.g., perception, memories, prefer-
ences, personality), people typically report the greatest identity
discontinuity when moral characteristics have been altered or
removed (Heiphetz, Strohminger, & Young, 2016; Strohminger &
Nichols, 2014, 2015), suggesting that moral traits are perhaps the
most prominent and central part of a person’s identity (Chen,
Urminsky, & Bartels, 2016). Our results provide a novel contri-
bution to this burgeoning literature on the role of morality in
constructing and perceiving the self by showing that participants
judge their moral transgressions during periods of time when they
felt very different than—as opposed to very similar to—their
current selves as more morally wrong. Doing so likely facilitates a
greater sense of self-improvement over time and the ability to view
oneself as moral and good in the present.
Conclusion
Although what purportedly comprises the self includes core
beliefs and events from the personal past, few researchers have
investigated recollections of moral transgressions from the per-
sonal past or how those recollections interact with their con-
ceptions of the self. In part due to the inherent difficulty in
systematically investigating autobiographical memories (St.
Jacques & De Brigard, 2015), the majority of moral psychology
research has employed designs that present moral content in the
form of artificial vignettes created in the laboratory (e.g., Chi-
tuc, Henne, Sinnott-Armstrong, & De Brigard, 2016; Clifford,
Iyengar, Cabeza, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015). Comparatively
few studies have investigated prototypical, everyday instances
of immorality that have been personally experienced (however,
see Escobedo & Adolphs, 2010; FeldmanHall et al., 2012;
Hofmann et al., 2014; Knutson et al., 2010). This imbalance is
surprising given our prioritization of moral traits and values
when judging the overall favorability of others (Goodwin, Pi-
azza, & Rozin, 2014) and the fact that we define personal
identity largely in terms of moral characteristics (Strohminger
& Nichols, 2014). We provide novel contributions by investi-
gating how memories of lying and emotional harm are associ-
ated with the maintenance of a positive identity. Moreover, we
hope that the studies reported in the current article encourage
researchers to continue exploring different ways of integrating
Figure 4. For memories of emotional harm, we display frequency statistics for ratings of morality, valence, and
emotional intensity split by actor and recipient perspectives and by different-self and similar-self conditions. For
memories in the actor perspective, frequencies by number of memories recalled (y-axis) are depicted for each
possible rated value of morality (a), valence (b), and emotional intensity (c) measures. For memories in the
recipient perspective, frequencies by number of memories recalled (y-axis) are depicted for each possible rated
value of morality (d), valence (e), and emotional intensity (f) measures.
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research on autobiographical memory, moral cognition, and
personal identity.
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